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Abstract: This paper deals with the relationship between real exchange rate and growth in
the process of economic integration. Using a 2x2x2 model of overlapping generations, we
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mulation. Integration leads to convergence in growth rates only in presence of cross-border
externalities in human capital. Otherwise, divergence is likely to occur and integration may
be good (bad) for growth if the integrated RER is higher (lower) than the autarky’s RER. In
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1 Introduction
How does economic integration affect growth? This article addresses this question
theoretically developing a 2-country 2-sector endogenous growth model with educa-
tion. This framework allows to consider the relationship between real exchange rate
(RER) and growth which is specially relevant in the process of european economic
integration since RER still move even between eurozone members (Berka and Dev-
ereux (2010)).
In a recent work, Galor and Mountford (2008) highlight the influence of international
trade on human capital. They show that trade exerts opposite effects in developed
and developing countries. Education increases (decreases) in OECD (non-OECD)
countries. Economic integration goes beyond trade integration allowing capital mo-
bility between European countries. The model we develop highlights consequences
of this capital mobility in a two-sector setting. We assume there are two sectors in
the economy: a traded one and a nontraded one. The way capital mobility affect
human capital accumulation depends on the traded Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
gap between countries. This TFP gap reflects differences in relative prices of non-
traded to traded goods which can be considered as an internal real exchange rate. We
find that countries whose RER appreciates (depreciates) with integration accumulate
more (less) human capital and experience higher (lower) economic growth than in
autarky. In a general way, capital mobility prevents the RER from freely adjusting
and may be growth damaging.
The literature on capital mobility, exchange rate and growth is not yet well doc-
umented. Aghion et al. (2009) show that exchange rate volatility matters for growth
but especially for countries with relatively low levels of financial development. The
literature on export led growth models often shows the benefits for growth in main-
taining a low RER. First, Rodrik (2008) concludes that the depreciation is growth
enhancing when there exist some economic distorsions in the traded sector. This
explanation holds especially for Asian countries in which stages of growth acceler-
ations have followed RER depreciation. Elsewhere, evidence is mixed and growth
acceleration does not systematically follow episodes of depreciation. Eichengreen
(2008) concludes that for developing countries - before the beginning of the growth
process - depreciation is growth enhancing, driving resources out of the nontraded
to the traded sector. The common starting point of these papers is that there exist
some distorsions that prevent optimal resources allocation between the traded and
nontraded sectors detrimental to the traded sector [Prasad et al. (2007)]. However,
these models do insist on the fact that what is important for growth is to maintain
the "correct" RER instead of targeting an artificially low level of the RER1.
1Maintaining an artificially low level of the RER would generate costs in terms of inflation and
reserve accumulation and maybe benefits in terms of temporary growth. Eichengreen (2008) states
that the ratio between costs and benefits increases with the country’s level of development.
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Second, Harris (2001) shows empirically that the US Dollar appreciation against
the Canadian Dollar in the 1990’s is responsible for the technological spread between
US and Canada. His argument is based on the fact that when RER appreciates,
firms of the traded sector are forced to invest in R&D to maintain competitiveness
despite the fact that their traded prices are higher. There were more incentives to
invest for US firms than for Canadian ones. This may explain part of the technological
difference. Finally, the relationship between relative prices and relative productivities
is positive for developed countries [Canzoneri et al. (1999)]. This means that growth
episodes in developed countries are frequently associated with real appreciations.
This is not the case for developing countries [Ito et al. (1999)].
The model we develop in this paper is a two-sector generalization of the Michel
and Vidal (1999) framework. In the Michel and Vidal one-sector model, determi-
nants of growth were patience, altruism and the size of the external effect in human
capital accumulation. Introducing a second sector of production, the RER matters
for growth as well. The way the RER is determined depends on the assumption con-
cerning capital mobility; so do growth determinants. In autarky, this RER clears
the nontraded goods market and as a result depends on the propensity to consume
services, the degree of altruism, the saving rate. In autarky, the more services the
country consumes, the higher the relative price, the higher the return on education
-if nontraded sector is labor intensive-, the higher the growth rate. Conversely, when
capital is perfectly mobile between countries, RER no longer depends on demand and
supply factors but only depends on TFP gap between traded and nontraded sectors.
This derives from the fact that there are as many mobile factors as sectors in this
economy. Then, the return on human capital -the wage- is no longer a function of
global capital intensity. Instead it only depends on the RER and capital mobility
implies that marginal products of capital are the same between countries. The higher
traded productivity, the more appreciated the RER [Balassa-Samuelson effect].
Integration leads to convergence in growth rates only in presence of cross-border
externalities.
Nevertheless empirical evidence does not suggest that integration in Europe has
promoted convergence of growth rates. Indeed, the divergence of growth rates looks
higher over the recent period (1991-2005) than it was before economic integration
(1970-1990) [See Table 1].
When we reject the cross-border externality assumption, integration leads effec-
tively to divergence: integration may be good (bad) for growth if the integrated
RER is higher (lower) than the autarky’s RER. The intuition of this result is that a
higher RER stimulates human capital accumulation. Capital mobility prevents the
RER from adjusting and may lead to an inapropriate resource allocation between
the two sectors. In this case, it will not be growth enhancing. This result is in line
with Eichengreen (2008) in the sense that the policy recommendation would be to
allow the relative price to keep the autarky level which corresponds to the "correct"
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Per Capita GDP growth rates 1970-1990 1991-2005
Austria 1.84 1.70
Belgium 1.70 1.57
Denmark 1.29 1.88
Finland 1.97 2.28
France 1.73 1.40
Germany 1.92 1.18
Greece 0.79 2.44
Ireland 2.43 5.61
Italy 2.19 1.02
Luxembourg 2.72 2.93
Netherland 1.31 1.62
Portugal 2.45 1.54
Spain 1.50 2.15
Sweden 1.20 1.93
United Kingdom 1.64 2.39
Average Deviation 0.41 0.69
Standard Deviation 0.52 1.09
Interquartile Range (25%-75%) 068 0.78
Table 1: European GDP growth rates. Source: Eurostat and Author’s calculations.
level given the fundamentals (altruism, productivity, savings). In this model, capital
mobility may lead to RER misalignment and growth reduction in the less altruistic
country. Finally, this paper complements the existing literature. It points out that
an additional cost of maintaining an RER too low - inflation and reserves accumu-
lation are often blamed - decreases the incentive to accumulate human capital and
is then bad for growth. Whereas the literature [Prasad et al. (2007) Rodrik (2008),
Eichengreen (2008)] suggests that a significantly overvalued RER is growth reducing
as well.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 deals
with autarky whereas Section 4 deals with integration introducing capital mobility
between the two countries. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a two-country model that is an extension of Michel and Vidal (1999)
in which we introduce two production sectors: a tradable sector and a non tradable
sector. We normalize the traded good price to unity. In this setting, the relative
price of the nontraded good, PN , also denotes the domestic real exchange rate. We
consider that the nontraded good is perishable and then is a pure consumption good.
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The traded good is a mixed good which can either be consumed or invested. This
two-sector production structure is a generalization of the standard two-sector setting
in which one good is a pure consumption while the other is a pure investment good
[Galor (1992), Venditti (2005)]. The world consists of two countries which accumulate
human capital and experiment endogenous growth.
2.1 Production
The representative firm produces in two sectors: the tradable, and the non-tradable
one. Production in the tradable (YT ) and in the non-tradable (YN) sector resulting
from two Cobb-Douglas production technologies, using two inputs, human capital H,
and physical capital K. Let Ki and Li, i = T,N , be respectively the quantities of
capital and labor used by sector i, production is given by
YT = ATK
αT
T H
1−αT
T (1)
YN = ANK
αN
N H
1−αN
N (2)
with αT , αN ∈ (0, 1), AT > 0 and AN > 0.
Investment instantaneously transforms a unit of tradable good into a unit of installed
capital: Kt+1 = It and capital fully depreciates after one period. Both inputs are
perfectly mobile between the two sectors provided that:
HT +HN ≤ H, KT +KN ≤ K (3)
K being the total stock of physical capital and H the total amount of human capital.
Let ki = Ki/Hi be the capital intensity of sector i, hi = Hi/H be the share of human
capital allocated to sector i, i = T,N , and k = K/H the physical to human capital
ratio. Equations (2), (3) and (5) can be rewritten:
hT + hN ≤ 1, kThT + kNhN ≤ k (4)
yT = ATk
αT
T (5)
yN = ANk
αN
N (6)
where yT and yN are the production per unit of human capital in each sector.
Denoting w the wage rate, R the gross rental rate of capital and PN the price of the
non tradable good, profit maximization over the two sectors implies that production
factors are paid their marginal product:
Rt = αTATkT
αT−1
t = PNtαNANkN
αN−1
t (7)
wt = (1− αT )ATkT αTt = PNt(1− αN)ANkNαNt (8)
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From which we derive the physical to human capital ratios as functions of the price
of the non tradable good:
kT t = B(PNt)
1
αT−αN
kNt =
αN (1−αT )
αT (1−αN )B(PNt)
1
αT−αN
with B =
(
αN
αT
) αN
αT−αN
(
AN
AT
) 1
αT−αN
(
1−αT
1−αN
) αN−1
αT−αN
(9)
And thus the input prices are:
wt = (1− αT )ATBαTPN
αT
αT−αN
t ≡ w(PNt)
Rt = αTATB
αT−1PN
αT−1
αT−αN
t ≡ R(PNt) (10)
2.2 Consumption, savings and children’s education
The economy consists, in each country, of a sequence of three individual life periods.
In the second period of his life, each individual gives birth to 1 + n children so that
population grows at rate n. We assume the population growth rate is the same in
the two countries. Each generation born in period t consists of Nt identical individ-
uals who make decisions concerning consumption, children’s education, and savings.
During childhood, individuals make no decision: their consumption is included in
their parent’s consumption. They are reared by their parents who decide on their
level of educational attainment. When adult, they work and receive the market wage,
consume, save, and rear their own children. When old they retire, and consume the
proceeds of their savings.
Individuals care about their children’s education. They exhibit a kind of pater-
nalistic altruism whereby they value their child’s human capital. Our modeling of
intergenerational altruism follows Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) who assume that
the parental bequest is the quality of education received by their children. The
preferences of an individual belonging to generation t are represented by:
U(ct, dt+1, ht+1) = (1− β)lnct + βlndt+1 + γlnht+1 (11)
where ct, dt+1 and ht+1 are respectively consumption when adult, consumption when
old, and the child’s human capital; β ∈]0, 1[ denotes individuals’ thrift and γ is the
altruism factor. When adult, each agent born at t supplies inelastically ht+1 units
of efficient labor. The level of human capital of each adult depends on his parent’s
decision on education during his childhood:
ht+1 = bte
a
t (12)
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where bt is an externality, et the amount of resources a parent devotes to his child’s
education, and a ∈]0, 1[ the elasticity of the technology of human capital formation.
Let x = c, d denote individual consumption at each period of life, xN and xT be
respectively the spending allocated to nontraded and traded goods. Instantaneous
preferences over the two goods are defined according to:
x = xµTx
1−µ
N (13)
with µ ∈ (0, 1). We denote pi the consumer price index in terms of traded good.
Adults distribute their earnings that consist of labor income, wtht, among own con-
sumption spending, investment in child’s education, and savings, st,
wtht = pitct + et + st (14)
When old, individuals retire and consume the proceeds of their savings:
Rt+1st = pit+1dt+1 (15)
An individual born in period t− 1 is endowed with ht units of human capital at the
beginning of adulthood, and chooses et and st so as to maximize his life-cycle utility
(11) under his budget constraints (12), (14) and (15). An individual’s optimal choice
is characterized by the first order conditions:
−1− β
pitct
+
βRt+1
pit+1dt+1
= 0 (16)
−1− β
pitct
+
γa
et
= 0 (17)
cTt = µpitct
PNtcNt = (1− µ)pitct
pi = φ (µ) ≡ µ−µ (1− µ)−(1−µ)
(18)
Equation (16) characterizes the optimal allocation of consumption for an individ-
ual over his lifetime. Equation (17) gives the optimal investment in the offspring’s
human capital. An adult reduces his consumption spending until his loss equates
the increment in the utility he derives from his child’s level of human capital out of
altruism. Equations (18) give the static allocation of consumption spending between
the two goods.
Plugging (14) and (15) into (16) and (17) yields:
st =
β
1 + γa
wtht (19)
et =
γa
1 + γa
wtht (20)
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As usual in overlapping generation models with paternalistic altruism, savings
increase with individual’s thrift and decrease with altruism. The more altruistic
parents are, the more they invest in their offspring’s education.
2.3 Cross-border external effects in human capital
Throughout the analysis, foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk. We assume
cross-border externalities in human capital formation. An individual’s investment in
his child’s human capital generates a positive externality for his country’s fellows.
We assume an externality of the form:
bt = b(pet + p
∗e∗t )
λet
1−a−λ and b∗t = b(pet + p
∗e∗t )
λe∗t
1−a−λ (21)
where b > 0, λ ∈ [0, 1− a], p = N/(N +N∗) and p∗ = 1− p. Since population grows
at the same rate in the two countries, p and p∗, the shares of each country in the
world population, are constant.
We denote respectively et and et∗ the average levels of investment in children’s human
capital in the home and the foreign country. Since individuals are identical within
each country, in equilibrium: et = et and e∗t = et∗. The magnitude of these cross-
border external effects is given by λ. The term (pet + p∗et∗)λ is intended to capture
the strength of international spillover of knowledge. The higher λ, the more the home
country benefits from the foreign country’s private expenditures in education.
In equilibrium, human capital depends both on domestic and foreign investment
in education and on cross-border externality in human capital formation:
ht+1 = btet
a = b(pet + p
∗e∗t )
λe1−λt (22)
Let ρt = e∗t/et be the ratio of foreign over home average investment in children’s
human capital and gt = et/et−1 − 1 the economy growth rate. Using equations (20),
(22) and finally (10), we obtain:
1 + gt =
γab
1 + γa
(1− αT )ATkT tαT (p+ p∗ρt−1)λ ≡ Gt (23)
2.4 The nontradable market clearing condition
Since there exists a nontraded good, we should consider a market clearing condition
for that good:
PNtY
N
t = NtPNtcNt +Nt−1PNtdNt (24)
This equation simply states that production equals total consumption in nontraded
goods. We can rewrite this condition with only wage, interest factor and physical to
human capital ratios:
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Lemma 1 The home country non tradable market clearing condition can be written
1− µ
1 + γa
((1− β)wt + βRt
1 + n
1 + γa
γab(p+ p∗ρ∗t−1)λ
) = PNtANDkT
αN−1(kt − kT t) (25)
With D = (αN (1−αT ))
αN (αT (1−αN ))1−αN
αN−αT .
Proof: see Appendix 7.1.
It can be noted that expression D is the same for both countries as we assume home
and foreign technologies have identical elasticities of substitution between production
factors.
3 Autarky
As we first consider autarky, we rule out any interactions between countries. In-
vestments in human capital in one country do not result in an external effect that
enhances the formation of human capital in the other (λ = 0). The human capital
externality depends only on the average level of education. From equation (21), we
have with λ = 0: bt = bet1−a. From equation (22), since individuals are identical,
social returns on human capital investment are constant in equilibrium ht+1 = bet.
Young people’s savings finance the following period’s physical capital:
Kt+1 = Ht+1kt+1 = Ntst (26)
The labor market clears:
Ht = Ntht (27)
Combining (19),(20), (22), (26) and (27), we obtain the constant equilibrium physical
to human capital ratio:
k ≡ kA = β
γab(1 + n)
(28)
We then compute the equilibrium autarkic growth rate gA.
Lemma 2 The autarkic growth factor is:
1 + gA =
γab
1 + γa
(1− αT )ATkT αT (29)
with2
kT = k
A αT
1− αT
1− µαT − (1− µ)αN
1−µ
1+γa
(1− β)(αN − αT ) + αT
(30)
2Notice that kT > 0 if and only if αN > αT or αT > αN and µ < 1−αNαT−αN . If technology is the
same in both sectors αT = αN and kT = kA.
8
Proof: see Appendix 7.2.
The following proposition contains some comparative statics results relating the long-
run growth rate to preference parameters.
Proposition 1 The more patient individuals are, the higher the growth rate. The
growth rate is first increasing and then decreasing with γ reaching a maximum in
γ¯ =
1−2αT+
√
1+4((1−µ)(1−β)(αN−αT ))
2aαT
. Moreover, if αT > αN (respectively αN > αT ),
the growth rate is decreasing (respectively increasing) in µ.
Proof: see Appendix 7.3.
The more altruistic individuals are, the higher their investment in children’s education
and the lower their consumption. We obtain, as in Michel and Vidal (1999), that
excessive as well as weak altruism can lead to poor growth records.
When the tradable sector is capital intensive (αT > αN), the growth rate decreases
with the preference for tradable goods (µ). This is a consequence of the Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem. An increase in the propensity to consume the traded good (µ)
leads to an RER depreciation. Since the nontraded good is labor intensive, the real
depreciation entails a fall in the wage. Then, the return to human capital decreases
and so does the growth rate. Hereafter, to fit empirical evidence [Ito et al. (1999)],
we consider:
Assumption 1 αN < αT .
4 Economic integration and growth
We consider a two-country overlapping generations world in which countries differ in
both levels of patience and altruism. We establish the growth implications of world
economic integration.
In the integrated economy, as we assume no labor mobility between the two countries,
the labor market clearing condition of the domestic country is given as in autarky
by equation (27). Equation (25) gives the non tradable market clearing conditions
for the home country. The foreign country equations are obtained if we denote by ∗
foreign variables.
In a two-country integrated world, there are capital flows between countries and the
equality between domestic savings and domestic investment -equation (26)- no longer
holds. The amount saved by adults in the home and the foreign country in period t
is equal to the physical capital available as productive input in period t+ 1 :
Kt+1 +K
∗
t+1 = Ntst +N
∗
t s
∗
t (31)
Dividing by the world population, the world capital market clearing condition is:
(1 + n)
(
pkt+1ht+1 + (1− p)k∗t+1h∗t+1
)
= pst + (1− p)s∗t (32)
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4.1 Convergence of countries’ growth rates
With perfect capital mobility, the interest rate is the same for both countries:
Rt = R
∗
t (33)
Using (10), we can determine the ratio between domestic and foreign relative prices:
PNt
P ∗Nt
=
[
A∗N
AN
] [
AT
A∗T
] 1−αN
1−αT
(34)
This ratio reflects the bilateral real exchange rate between these two countries. Using
equation (20) we can compute the ratio of foreign over home average investment in
children’s human capital:
ρt+1 =
e∗t+1
et+1
=
γ∗
γ
1 + γa
1 + γ∗a
w∗t+1h
∗
t+1
wt+1ht+1
(35)
Integrating human capital accumulation from equation (22), we have:
ρt+1 =
γ∗
γ
1 + γa
1 + γ∗a
w∗t+1
wt+1
ρt
1−λ (36)
Using expression of wages as functions of PN and P ∗N , from equation (10), we obtain:
ρt+1 =
γ∗
γ
1 + γa
1 + γ∗a
(
P ∗Nt+1
PNt+1
) αT
αT−αN
(
A∗N
AN
) αT
αT−αN
(
AT
A∗T
) αN
αT−αN
ρt
1−λ (37)
Integrating equation (34), we can then determine the foreign relative to home growth
on the steady path:
ρt+1 =
γ∗
γ
1 + γa
1 + γ∗a
(
A∗T
AT
) 1
1−αT
ρt
1−λ (38)
To understand the importance of cross-border externalities, we consider first the case
without cross-border external effects (λ = 0), which corresponds to the case where
countries can exchange capital and goods but the education level in one country does
not affect the human capital formation in the other country. Second, we focus on the
case with cross-border external effects.
4.1.1 Divergence without cross-border external effects
Economic integration without cross-border external effects corresponds to the case
where λ = 0 and thus bt = be1−at as in autarky. Equation (38) becomes:
ρt =
1 + g∗t
1 + gt
ρt−1 (39)
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With
1 + g∗t
1 + gt
=
γ∗
γ
1 + γa
1 + γ∗a
[
A∗T
AT
] 1
1−αT
(40)
Convergence of growth rates means that (1 + g∗t )/(1 + gt) = 1. If the altruism
factor is the same in both countries γ = γ∗, convergence is obtained if and only if
A∗T = AT . Thus if countries differ with respect to their total factor productivity
(TFP), convergence is no longer possible.
If altruism factors differ, convergence means:
γ∗
γ
1 + γa
1 + γ∗a
[
A∗T
AT
] 1
1−αT
= 1 (41)
We have thus proved a first result concerning convergence of growth rates :
Proposition 2 Without cross-border external effects, for identical altruism factors
(γ = γ∗), if there exists a gap between traded TFP A∗T 6= AT , perfect capital
mobility does not result in convergence in growth rates. Convergence in growth
rates may occur for very special altruism factors only, namely3 γ = Γ(γ∗) with
Γ(γ∗) =
[(
1
γ∗ + a
)(
AT
A∗T
) 1
1−αT − a
]−1
.
We may notice that if (1 + g∗t )/(1 + gt) < 1, then limt→∞ ρt = 0 meaning that the
foreign education level e∗ becomes in the long run very small compared to the home
education level e. Symmetrically, if (1 + g∗t )/(1 + gt) > 1, then limt→∞ ρt = +∞,
meaning that e∗ becomes much higher than e.
In the literature, the one-sector model concludes that integration systematically pro-
motes convergence of growth rates when both countries have the same degree of
altruism. This is no longer the case in a two-sector model. Introducing a 2-sector
setting, we show here that what matters for economic growth is not only the altruism
factors but also the traded productivity spread between the home and the foreign
country which determines the RER through equation (34). The higher productiv-
ity in the traded sector, the higher the growth rate. This is an illustration of the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem when the traded sector is capital intensive. Indeed, the
RER affects wages and then education and growth. A higher RER increases return
on human capital and stimulates education. The proposition states that if both coun-
tries have the same traded total factor productivity (TFP), the more altruistic the
country, the higher the growth rate in an integrated world. Assume that there is a
technological gap between countries and let the foreign country be the technologically
"advanced" country. The foreign country will have the highest growth rate except if
the domestic country has a sufficient degree of altruism (γ > Γ (γ∗)). Altruism can
3if AT ≥ A∗T or γ∗ <
(
a
((
A∗T
AT
) 1
1−αT − 1
))−1
then γ is positive.
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be interpreted in terms of education spending. An "advanced" country continues to
have the highest growth except if the other country invests enough in education to
catch up on this technological gap.
4.1.2 Convergence with cross-border external effects
Introducing cross-border external effects, each country can benefit from a higher level
of education in the other country. Using equation (38) with 0 < λ < 1−a, there exist
two steady state values for ρ. The trivial long run value ρ = 0, and a positive one ρ¯ :
ρ¯ =
(
γ∗
γ
1 + γa
1 + γ∗a
[
A∗T
AT
] 1
1−αT
) 1
λ
(42)
As λ ∈ (0, 1), the sequence of {ρt} tends towards ρ¯ and growth rates converge. The
result is true for any value of altruism degrees, and especially with same altruism
factors (γ = γ∗). We have thus proved:
Proposition 3 With cross-border external effects, perfect capital mobility results in
convergence in growth rates for any possible altruism factors.
Thus the existence of cross-country external effects in human capital guarantees
convergence of growth rates. Nevertheless, empirical evidence suggests that such
external effects are not observed. As a result, cross border external effects are gener-
ally absent in models where labor is not mobile between countries. In line with this
literature, we focus on the realistic case without cross-border effects.
4.2 Growth rates and integration without cross-border effects
Without cross-border effect, i.e. when λ = 0, Proposition 2 states that convergence
in growth rates never occurs except for a very special ratio of altruism degrees. As a
result, if there is a spread between technologies, the divergence in growth rates may
last forever.
We now consider the world allocation of savings in the case without cross-border
externalities. Denoting x ≡ β∗γ/βγ∗ then, from equation (28), k∗A = xkA. In this
two-country two-sector model, only one good can be traded. Nontraded good is
exclusively produced domestically. In some extreme cases, when the propensity to
consume and/or the preference for non traded good are high, the representative firm
tends to produce mainly nontraded goods, the traded good being imported. As
we consider a human capital intensive non-traded production, to guarantee physical
capital accumulation, we have to assume:
Assumption 2 −ζ
1−ζ <
xη
η∗ <
1−ζ
ζ
.
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We obtain the following lemma which provides a simple expression of the world capital
accumulation equation, and expressions of the physical to human capital ratios:
Lemma 3 In an integrated world, the international capital market clearing condition
is:
pkt+1 + (1− p)k∗t+1ρt = pkA + (1− p)k∗Aρt (43)
and, under assumption 2 the physical to human capital ratios are:
kt = ηPN
1
αT−αN
t + ζkA (44)
k∗t = η
∗PNt
1
αT−αN + ζxkA (45)
The domestic price of the nontraded good is:
PN
1
αT−αN
t+1 =
kA (ρt(1− p)x+ p) (1− ζ)
ρt(1− p)η∗ + pη (46)
with η > 0, η∗ > 0 and ζ of the sign of αN − αT .4
Proof: see Appendix 7.4.
From equation (46), the price of the nontraded good PNt+1 depends on time only
through ρt. But equations (39) and (40) show that education levels between countries
diverge with ρt tends to zero or infinity. We focus on the case of divergence, ρt → 0,
where education in the domestic country becomes very large with respect to education
in the foreign country. The domestic growth rate 1 + g increases with kT through
equation (23). Since kT is increasing with the global physical to human capital ratio
k through the price of the nontraded good5 PN , then, 1 + g is increasing with k. By
symmetry, 1 + g∗ is increasing with k∗.
We finally state:
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 1 and 2, the home country converges to its autar-
kic physical to human capital ratio, and growth rates diverge iff γ > Γ(γ∗) (Condition
1). Perfect capital mobility then results in a decrease (increase) in the foreign country
growth rate iff xη
η∗ < 1 (>) (Condition 2).
Proof: see Appendix 7.5.
Let us define the "leading" country as the country with the higher education
spending and/or the higher traded productivity; this leading country is the home
country if γ > Γ (γ∗). The proposition states on one hand that the growth rate with
4The expressions of η, η∗, and ζ are given in Appendix 7.4.
5From equation (9), kT is increasing with PN iff αT > αN and from equation (44), PN is
increasing with k iff αT > αN .
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integration corresponds to the autarky growth rate of the "leading" country. On the
other hand, integration may be growth reducing for the foreign country.
To sum up, with a sufficient degree of altruism (education spending), integration
does not change the home country’s growth rate whereas consequences of integration
are mixed in the foreign country. If A∗T/AT and/or β∗/β are high (low) enough6, then
the foreign country’s growth rate is higher (lower) with integration.
This proposition means that integration may have dramatic consequences if the
two countries are not similar enough in terms of productivity, altruism and saving
rates. Indeed, it may lead to a growth reduction for the lowest traded TFP country -
and/or the less altruistic country. This is a typically two-sector (2x2) setting result.
In such a model, growth depends on the level of the RER. In autarky, this RER is
directly linked to altruism, savings and nontraded consumption. Integration involves
perfect capital mobility between countries. The 2x2 model becomes a 2x2x2 model.
Capital mobility implies that relative prices no longer depend either on domestic
savings, altruism or propensity to consume. Instead, relative prices only depend on
relative traded and nontraded productivity through equation (34).
Let us consider that β = β∗ and γ = γ∗. Conditions (1) and (2) become A∗T < AT .
In this case, Proposition 4 simply states that the growth rate with integration is
the autarky growth rate of the home country which is the leading one in terms of
productivity - since we have assumed identical altruism degrees- and that economic
growth in the foreign country is worst in the case of integration.
In autarky, factor returns and growth rate are lower in the foreign country :
wA/w∗A = RA/R∗A = PAN/P
∗A
N =
(
1 + gA
)
/
(
1 + g∗A
)
= AT/A
∗
T > 1. Capital
mobility changes the way relative prices are determined: relative prices then result
from equation (34). Relative prices depend only on relative traded TFP. Since AT >
A∗T , we still have PN > P ∗N from equation (34) but the ratio between these two prices
is higher7: PN/P ∗N = (AT/A∗T )
(1−αN )/(1−αT ) . This means that P ∗N < PA∗N , w∗ < wA∗
and the foreign country’s growth rate is even lower in an integrated world.
The intuition is as follows. With capital mobility, the domestic and foreign returns
on capital converge to a common world return on capital. This common world return
is the one of the "leading" country - the Home country in our simple case. Then,
integration consists of an increase in the foreign return on capital compared to the
foreign autarky case. This increase in the foreign return comes from a decrease in the
foreign relative price. With capital mobility, the foreign relative price is stuck at a too
low level compared to what it would be in autarky. As a result, the foreign country’s
growth rate will be lower than in autarky for the foreign country (g∗ < gA∗). This
mechanism works when β = β∗ and γ = γ∗, as soon as there is a traded TFP spread
between the two countries. We focused on the simplest case (β = β∗, γ = γ∗) but
6Notice that Condition 2 is equivalent to
(
A∗T
AT
) 1
1−αT < βγ
∗(1+γ∗a)(ζ(1−αT )(1−β)+(1+γa))
β∗γ(1+γa)(ζ(1−αT )(1−β∗)+(1+γ∗a))
7This ratio is higher when αT > αN .
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conditions (1) and (2) allow all cases to be considered. The leading country can be
the higher TFP country or the more altruistic country or the lower time-preference
country, other things being equal.
5 Calibrations
Table 2 collects parameter values. Since we focus on the case without cross-border
externality we set a = 1 and then λ = 0. Education technology b is assumed to be
unity. As usual in two-sector models, we assume half of consumption is dedicated to
traded goods: µ = 0.5. In the model, β/ (1 + γa) denotes the saving rate whereas
γa/ (1 + γa) denotes education spending. Our calibration is consistent with figures
collected in Table 3 where we assume each period of life lasts for 25 years. Using
Beine et al. (2002), the rate of time preference is supposed to be around 3.7%, then
we assume β = 0.4 and then γ∗ = 0.36. In Figures 2, the discount rates β and β∗
lie between 0.3 and 0.4 to consider differences in saving behavior between countries.
Finally, population growth reflects French annual population growth: 0.4%. Notice
that in Table 3, education spending represents the sum of public spending (4.64%)
and private spending (0.67%).
αT αN R µ n γ
∗ β β∗
0.65 0.2 1.64 0.5 0.105 0.36 0.3 or 0.4 0.3 or 0.4
Table 2: Parameter values
Education spending (% of GDP) 5.31%
Households saving rate (% of GDP) 5.8%
Table 3: Average on 27 European countries (2006). Source: Eurostat.
Assuming capital shares in production of traded and nontraded sectors respec-
tively of 0.65 and 0.2, we obtain in autarky that production of traded goods cor-
responds to 40.5% of GDP. Factor allocation between the two sectors is such that
kT = 1.58kN and the autarky interest rate is R = 2.77 which represents an an-
nual real interest rate of 2.3%. These figures are consistent with empirical evidence
since traded output represents 40% of total output [Mahbub Morshed and Turnovsky
(2004)].
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 2 which states that convergence in growth rates is
obtained for very special rates of altruism only. The convergence line is the dotted line.
If the two countries have the same traded TFP, identical rates of altruism guarantee
convergence (AT/A∗T = 1, γ = γ∗ = 0.36). If the domestic country has a higher
traded TFP, then convergence occurs only for a domestic rate of altruism γ = 0.305
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Figure 1: Domestic and foreign growth in an integrated world
which is lower than the foreign one (AT/A∗T = 1.05, γ∗ = 0.36). The intuition is that
in order to converge, the foreign country must offset the lag in technology by higher
education spending. Similarly, if the domestic country has a lower traded TFP, then
convergence occurs only for a domestic rate of altruism γ = 0.429 which is higher
than the foreign one (AT/A∗T = 0.95, γ∗ = 0.36).
Figures 2a, 2a’, 2b and 2b’ illustrate Proposition 4. If γ > Γ (γ∗) , then the domes-
tic country converges to its autarky growth rate and growth rates diverge. Figures
2a and 2b plot the relative price - or more precisely the variable Z = P 1/(αT−αN )N - as a
function of the domestic rate of altruism γ. The dotted line represents the threshold
Γ (γ∗) . Notice that on these figures, the domestic country is the leading country
only when γ > Γ (γ∗). Otherwise, the foreign country becomes the leading country.
Figure 2a (2b) corresponds to the case where the domestic country has a lower
traded (higher) TFP but a higher (lower) discount rate (β). The consequences of
capital mobility on the relative price depend both on the technological gap between
the two countries and on the rates of time preference. If the domestic country inte-
grates with a high-TFP-low-saving foreign country and γ < Γ (γ∗) , its relative price
depreciates (black line) compared to what it would be in autarky relative price (grey
line). Conversely, if the domestic country integrates with a low-TFP-high-saving
foreign country and γ < Γ (γ∗), its relative price appreciates (black line) compared
16
Figure 2a Figure 2b
Figure 2a’ Figure 2b’
Figure 2: Benefit from integration, Real Exchange Rate and Domestic altruism
to what it would be in autarky (grey line). Otherwise γ > Γ (γ∗) and the domestic
country converges to its autarky equilibrium (black line) in both cases.
In this two-sector model, economic growth depends only on the RER. Figure
2a’ (2b’) depicts the ratio k/kA8 to compare the benefits of integration on growth
when the domestic country integrates with a high-traded-TFP-low-saving country
(low-traded-TFP-high-saving country). We focus on the case where γ < Γ (γ∗) . The
advantage of integration depends on the gap between the grey and the black lines
on Figures 2a and 2b. On Figure 2a (2b), integration leads to an RER depreciation
8Notice that from equations (23), (29) and (30), G/Ga = (k/kA)αT .
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(appreciation) compared to the autarky relative price; thus, integration is growth
damaging (enhancing): G/Ga < 1 (G/Ga > 1). In a standard one-sector model,
capital mobility affects economic growth in each country because growth no longer
depends on the domestic saving rate. In this two-sector model, economic growth
also depends on the relative price, and then on the traded TFP gap between the
two countries. When a low-TFP-high-saving domestic country integrates with a
high-TFP-low-saving foreign country, capital mobility entails a depreciation, and
growth rate with integration (G) is lower than the autarky growth rate (GA). Capital
mobility is then growth reducing when the rate of altruism is too low (γ < Γ (γ∗)) in
a low-TFP-high saving country (see Figure 2a’). This means that a low-education-
spending-low-traded-TFP-high-saving country has a higher growth rate in autarky.
This calibration exercise shows that capital mobility prevents the relative price
from adjusting. Sometimes this real exchange rate sluggishness may be damaging for
growth. The only case where growth may be better with capital mobility is in the
case of a low-altruism-high-traded-TFP-low-saving domestic country as depicted by
Figure 2b’.
6 Conclusion
This paper deals with capital mobility, RER and growth. Introducing a 2-sector
structure in Michel and Vidal (1999) we show that opening borders to trade and
factor mobility does lead to divergence between countries growth rates except if
there exist cross-border externalities in human capital accumulation. In this 2x2x2
model, consequences of integration are mixed and highly dependent on both altruism
and traded TFP gap between countries. Convergence is far from being the rule
even with capital mobility. When a low-traded-TFP-low-altruism domestic country
integrates with a high-TFP foreign country, capital mobility entails a depreciation
and a growth deterioration in the domestic country (compared to autarky). This
means that a low-education-spending-low-traded-TFP country has a higher growth
rate in autarky. When a high-traded-TFP-high-altruism domestic country integrates
with a low-TFP foreign country, capital mobility does not affect the domestic growth
rate but improves the foreign one (compared to autarky).
This paper concludes that capital mobility may lead to real exchange rate mis-
alignments which decrease growth in the less altruistic country with resulting income
divergence. Education policy may be an appropriate instrument to make convergence
more likely to occur. We leave this issue for future research.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Substituting equations (2) and (18) in equation (24), and dividing by Nt, we obtain:
(1− µ)pit(ct + dt
1 + n
) = PNtANkN
αN
t hthNt (47)
Integrating the budget constraints (14), (15) and the optimal level for st and et from
equations (19) and (20) gives:
1− µ
1 + γa
((1− β)wtht + βRtwt−1ht−1
1 + n
) = PNtANkN
αN
t hthNt (48)
Moreover, from the optimal choice of investment in children’s education(20) we know:
ht−1
ht
=
1 + γa
γabwt−1
e1−at−1
bt−1
And thus using equation (22) and dividing (48) by ht we get:
1− µ
1 + γa
((1− β)wt + βRt
1 + n
1 + γa
γab(p+ p∗ρt−1)λ
) = PNtANk
αN
Nt hNt (49)
As from equation (4), hN = k−kTkN−kT , the non tradable market clearing condition is:
1− µ
1 + γa
((1− β)wt + βRt
1 + n
1 + γa
γab(p+ p∗ρt−1)λ)
) = PNtANkN
αN
t
kt − kT t
kNt − kT t
(50)
From equations (9), we finally get the condition of the lemma.
7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Considering autarky, and thus λ = 0 and kt = kA, the non tradable market clearing
condition (25) is:
1− µ
1 + γa
((1− β)wt + kARt(1 + γa)) = PNtANDkT αN−1 (kA − kT t) (51)
Substituting PNt from equations (9):
1− µ
1 + γa
((1− β)wt + kARt(1 + γa)) = AT αT (1− αT )
αN − αT kT
αT−1 (kA − kT t) (52)
With factor prices from equations (7) and (8), we get:
1−µ
1+γa
(
(1− β)(1− αT )ATkT αT + kA(1 + γa)αTATkT αT−1
)
= AT
αT (1−αT )
αN−αT kT
αT−1 (kA − kT t)
(53)
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Dividing by kαT−1T :
1− µ
1 + γa
((1− β)(1− αT )ATkT + kA(1 + γa)αTAT ) = AT αT (1− αT )
αN − αT (kA − kT t)
(54)
From straightforward computations, we finally obtain equation (30). The last task is
to compute the equilibrium growth rate gA. Using equation (23), we readily obtain
equation (29).
7.3 Proof of Proposition 1
As kT = βγab(1+n)
αT
1−αT
(1−µαT−(1−µ)αN )(1+γa)
(1−µ)(1−β)(αN−αT )+αT (1+γa) , we can define the growth factor as a
function of β and γ:
1 + gA = ab(1− αT )AT γ
1 + γa
kαTT ≡ GA(β, γ, µ)
The logarithmic derivative of GA with respect to β is:
∂lnGA(β,γ,µ)
∂β
= αT
(
1
β
+ (1−µ)(αN−αT )
(1−µ)(1−β)(αN−αT )+αT (1+γa)
)
(55)
Which is positive if and only if
αN(1− µ) + αT (γa+ µ)
(1− µ)(1− β)(αN − αT ) + αT (1 + γa) ≥ 0 (56)
The numerator is always positive. The denominator is positive if and only if
β(1− µ)(αN − αT ) ≤ αN(1− µ) + αT (γa+ µ) (57)
which is true iff αN ≤ αT or αN ≥ αT and β ≤ β¯ with β¯ = αN (1−µ)+αT (γa+µ)(1−µ)(αN−αT ) . Since
β¯ > 1, the growth factor is always increasing with β.
Concerning the variation of the growth rate with γ. The logarithmic derivative of
GA with respect to γ is:
∂lnGA(β,γ,µ)
∂γ
= 1−αT
γ
− a(1−αT )
1+γa
− aαT 2
(1−µ)(1−β)(αN−αT )+αT (1+γa)
= (1−αT )((1−µ)(1−β)(αN−αT )+αT (1+γa))−aαT
2γ(1+γa)
γ(1+γa)((1−µ)(1−β)(αN−αT )+αT (1+γa))
(58)
Which is zero for a unique positive value of γ, γ¯ = 1−2αT+
√
1+4((1−µ)(1−β)(αN−αT ))
2aαT
,
positive for 0 ≤ γ ≤ γ¯ and negative for γ > γ¯ .
Concerning the variations of the growth rate with µ. As
∂lnGA(β,γ,µ)
∂µ
= αT (αN − αT )
{
(1−β)(1−αT )+αT (1+γa)
((1−µ)(1−β)(αN−αT )+αT (1+γa))(1−µαT−(1−µ)αN )
}
(59)
The denominator is positive from the previous analyses and the positivity of kT .
Thus this derivative is of the sign of αN − αT .
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7.4 Proof of Lemma 3
From equations (19) and (20), we obtain st = βetγa and s
∗
t =
β∗e∗t
γ∗a and thus the world
capital market clearing condition (32) becomes:
(1 + n)
(
pkt+1ht+1 + (1− p)k∗t+1h∗t+1
)
= p
βet
γa
+ (1− p)β
∗e∗t
γ∗a
(60)
Substituting the individual level of human capital for equation (22) :
(1 + n)b
(
pkt+1et + (1− p)k∗t+1e∗t
)
= p
βet
γa
+ (1− p)β
∗e∗t
γ∗a
(61)
dividing by et to write the equation as a function of ρt =
e∗t
et
, we obtain:
(1 + n)b(p+ p∗ρt)
(
pkt+1 + (1− p)k∗t+1ρt
)
= p
β
γa
+ (1− p) β
∗
γ∗a
ρt (62)
From equation (28), we have kA = β
(1+n)γab
and k∗A =
β∗
(1+n)γ∗ab , we finally get the
expression of the lemma, giving implicitly ρt.
Denoting x ≡ β∗γ
βγ∗ then k
∗
A = xk
A, and we can compute kt, k∗t as functions of PNt
for which we also give an expression.
Using equations (9) and (10) in equation (25), we obtain the nontraded goods market
clearing condition for the home country:
1−µ
1+γa
[
(1− β)w (PNt) + (1 + γa)kAR (PNt)
]
= PNtAND [kT (PNt)]
αN−1 (kt − kT (PNt))
(63)
Meaning that
kt =
(1− µ)
(
1−β
1+γa
w (PNt) + k
AR (PNt)
)
PNtAND [kT (PNt)]
αN−1 + kT (PNt) (64)
Substituting the expression of kT from equation (9), the factor prices wt and Rt
from equations (10), and simplifying by P
αT−1
αT−αN
Nt , we obtain:
kt = (1−µ)AT
AN
BαT−αN
D
[
(1− β)
(1 + γa)
(1− αT )BPNt
1
αT−αN + kAαT
]
+BPNt
1
αT−αN (65)
and similarly for the foreign country:
k∗t = (1− µ)
A∗T
A∗N
B∗αT−αN
D
[
(1− β∗)
(1 + γ∗a)
(1− αT )B∗P ∗Nt
1
αT−αN + kA
∗
αT
]
+B∗P ∗Nt
1
αT−αN
(66)
But as
AT
AN
BαT−αN
D
=
A∗T
A∗N
B∗αT−αN
D
=
αN − αT
αT (1− αT )
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and B can be rewritten B = ∆
(
AN
AT
) 1
αT−αN , B∗ = ∆
(
A∗N
A∗T
) 1
αT−αN where
∆ ≡
(
αN
αT
) αN
αT−αN
(
1−αT
1−αN
) αN−1
αT−αN is the same for both country.
Then we obtain the expressions for kt and k∗t given by equations (44) and (45), where:
η ≡ ∆
(
AN
AT
) 1
αT−αN
[
(1− µ)αN − αT
αT
1− β
1 + γa
+ 1
]
η∗ ≡ ∆
(
AN
A∗T
) 1
αT−αN
(
A∗T
AT
) 1−αN
(αT−αN )(1−αT )
[
(1− µ)αN − αT
αT
(1− β∗)
(1 + γ∗a)
+ 1
]
ζ ≡ (1− µ)αN − αT
1− αT
Finally, substituting those expressions in the world market clearing condition (43),
we obtain the expression of PNt given by equation (46).
It is clear that ζ is of the sign of αN − αT . Thus if αN < αT , we have ζ < 0 and we
need conditions to get k > 0 and k∗ > 0.
If E(ρt) ≡ ρt(1−p)x+pρt(1−p)η∗+pη , then from equations (44), (45) and (46), and the monotonicity
of E(.):
kt > 0⇔ E(ρt) > −ζ
η(1− ζ) ⇔
{
E(0) > −ζ
η(1−ζ) (a)
limρt→+∞E(ρt) >
−ζ
η(1−ζ) (b)
and kt∗ > 0⇔ E(ρt) > −ζx
η∗(1− ζ) ⇔
{
E(0) > −ζx
η∗(1−ζ) (c)
limρt→+∞E(ρt) >
−ζx
η∗(1−ζ) (d)
Conditions (a) and (d) always hold when ζ is negative, and under assumption 2,
conditions (b) and (c) hold.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 4
If γ > Γ(γ∗) then 1+g
∗
1+g
< 1 and ρt converges to zero as t goes to infinity.
But as from equation (43):
ρt =
p
1− p
kA − kt+1
k∗A − k∗t+1
then the capital stock of the home country kt converges to kA. From equations (45)
and (46) with ρ = 0, we have:
k∗t = k
∗
A
[
ζ + (1− ζ) η
∗
ηx
]
(67)
In order to understand the effect of economic integration in the foreign country,
it is important to compare the long term value of k∗ to the autarkic value k∗A.
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As we have assumed that αN < αT , we know 1− ζ > 0, and Condition 2 follows from
k∗ > k∗A iff
η∗
ηx
> 1. Since ζ(1− αT ) 1−β1+γa + αT > 0 and ζ(1− αT ) 1−β
∗
1+γ∗a + αT > 0 from
the proof of Proposition 1 and using the expressions of η, η∗ and x, we can rewrite
Condition 2 as :(
A∗T
AT
) 1
1−αT
>
β∗γ(1 + γ∗a) (ζ(1− αT )(1− β) + αT (1 + γa))
βγ∗(1 + γa) (ζ(1− αT )(1− β∗) + αT (1 + γ∗a))
But as 1 + g∗ < 1 + g means (
A∗T
AT
) 1
1−αT
<
γ(1 + γ∗a)
γ∗(1 + γa)
or equivalently:
xη
η∗
>
β∗
β
ζ(1− αT )(1− β) + αT (1 + γa)
ζ(1− αT )(1− β∗) + αT (1 + γ∗a)
This case is obtained under Assumption 2 when
Max
( −ζ
1− ζ ,
β∗
β
ζ(1− αT )(1− β) + αT (1 + γa)
ζ(1− αT )(1− β∗) + αT (1 + γ∗a)
)
<
xη
η∗
< 1
with γ such that:
β∗
β
ζ(1− αT )(1− β) + αT (1 + γa)
ζ(1− αT )(1− β∗) + αT (1 + γ∗a) < 1
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